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A plurality of recent events, the most noticeable of which was the 
abortive attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II, has raised the issue 
of Bulgarian clandestine involvement in Italian affairs for purposes 
that, at least in part, probably extend beyond the national boundaries 
of the Republic of Italy. Concurrently, this development, character-
ized by the media as the "Bulgarian connection," has generated an 
unprecedented interest on the part of the public and governmental 
authorities vis-a-vis Bulgarian domestic policy, Italian-Bulgarian re-
lations, and, not least, Bulgaria's role in the attainment of foreign 
policy objectives peculiar to the Soviet Union and its East European 
satellites. Until the emergence of the "Bulgarian connection," Italian 
interest in Bulgarian affairs was practically negligible. Formerly, this 
Balkan state was occasionally and, indeed, summarily considered solely 
in conjunciton with the politico-military posture of the Warsaw Pact 
or in relation to the still broader spectrum of Communist-inspired 
political regimes, regardless of their international alignment. 
In the absence of immediate and direct geopolitical preoccupa-
tions, former Italian aloofness regarding the Bulgarian scene is at-
tributable in no smaller measure to the concomitantly modest volume 
of commercial relations between the two countries. Significantly, even 
within the moderate flow of goods and services between Italy and the 
Communist states, as compared to Italy's booming trade with her 
Western partners and the developing nations, import-export statistics 
show that Bulgaria ranksonly in sixth place behind Yugoslavia, Hun-
gary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR.1 Another meaningful 
comparison is provided by a line of credit in the amount of Lit. 1,500 
billion granted by Italy in 1981 to Libya — a country with which she 
has entertained strained relations since 1969 — as opposed to the 
appreciably lower amount of Lit. 138 billion in Bulgaria's favor during 
the same year.2 
Although no denunciation of the "Bulgarian connection" was 
ever pronounced before 1982, at least two diplomatic incidents be-
tween Rome and Sofia had already occurred at the beginning of the 
1960s and of the 1970s, respectively. The first took place on January 
20, 1962, when a Bulgarian Mig 19 crash-landed near Acquaviva delle 
Fonti (Bari) after circling around NATO installations in the area. 
Moreover, the pilot, Lieutenant M. Solakov of the 11th Reconnais-
sance Squadron with duty station in Bergovitza, was found in pos-
session of an unexplainably large sum of money. He was repatriated 
one year later under less than clear circumstances.:t The second in-
cident entailed the expulsion, in 1972, of TABSO representative Bor-
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islav Baltchev and commercial attache Dimcho Vazov for undisclosed 
reasons. 
These incidents were presumably assessed by the Italian author-
ities as isolated occurrences, since no preventive security measures 
appear to have been specifically adopted against potential Bulgarian 
agents. Therefore, what is now termed the "Bulgarian connection" 
comprises events that span from the late 1970s to the start of the 
present decade. They include espionage/subversive actions attributed 
to labor union officials Luigi Scricciolo and Paola Elia, a never com-
pleted plot to assassinate Polish labor leader Lech Walesa while he 
was in Rome, the abortive assassination attempt against the "Polish 
Pope" in St. Peter's Square, and illicit marketing of weapons. 
At this particular stage of ongoing judicial, police, and intelligence 
investigations, there are four incidents that constitute the "Bulgarian 
connection" and reflect clandestine endeavors. The first is the Scric-
ciolo/Elia case.4 On February 4, 1982, Luigi Scricciolo and his wife, 
Paola Elia, both employed by the Italian Union of Labor (UIL), a 
moderately left-oriented labor union, were arrested on charges of 
espionage and participation in an armed band. The arrest warrants 
were issued subsequent to the confessions of three captured members 
of the Red Brigades (BR), Italy's major left-wing terrorist organiza-
tion, whose record includes murders, woundings, kidnappings, and 
"proletarian expropriations" since the beginning of the 1970s. 
The liberation, by a special unit of the Italian State Police, of U.S. 
Army Brigadier General James L. Dozier, who had been abducted by 
the BR in Verona on December 17, 1981 and held captive in Padua 
until January 28, 1982, resulted in testimony by repentant red bri-
gadists Antonio Savasta, Emilia Libera, and Loris Scricciolo (a cousin 
of Luigi). They identified Luigi Scricciolo and Paola Elia as BR points 
of contact and sources of information with Bulgarian connections. 
Moreover, according to the same terrorist sources, Scricciolo and Elia 
were of value to the BR in re-establishing interrupted weapon-supply 
channels with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). This was 
done through the good offices of the Bulgarians, who were in turn 
interested in General Dozier's "interrogation record," given his sen-
sitive position as Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and Administra-
tion of NATO's Southern European Land Forces with headquarters 
in the city of Verona in northern Italy. 
Initially, both Scricciolo and Elia denied all charges. However, in 
June of 1982, approximately four months after their arrest, the couple 
began to make progressive admissions, with each partner accusing 
the other of being responsible for the more serious offenses. Their 
admissions, coupled with the confessions of the above-mentioned ter-
rorists and with the investigation subsequently conducted by the Rome 
investigative unit of the Carabinieri (a militarily organized national 
police force) have produced an elaborate reconstruction of the case. 
From 1977 to 1979, Luigi Scricciolo had been active in the ranks 
of Proletarian Democracy (DP), a small political party of the extreme 
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left. As DP's international relations specialist, Scricciolo came into 
contact with accredited Bulgarian diplomats, who eventually provided 
him with subsidies badly needed by DP in exchange for political and 
military information. In June of 1979, Scricciolo resigned from DP. 
Later in the year, he married Paola Elia and joined the staff of UIL's 
international relations department, where his wife also worked. In 
view of the couple's access to various types of domestic and interna-
tional political and economic information, Scricciolo was approached 
by his old Bulgarian contacts, who successfully blackmailed him with 
his past actions on their behalf. 
The sensitive nature of Scricciolo's and Elia's work in UIL's in-
ternational department included frequent and close contacts with Pol-
ish labor union Solidarnosc and its leader, Lech Walesa. Both spouses 
reportedly received monthly compensation from the Bulgarians for 
a variety of services ranging from information on Italian affairs and 
reports on Polish and U.S. labor union matters, on one hand, to 
organizing a network of Italian students in the United States for the 
purpose of acquiring political and technical data, on the other. They 
are also accused of providing the BR with similar information. With 
respect to espionage efforts against the United States, Elia appears to 
have carried out the primary role because of her trips to that country 
in conjunction with her official UIL duties. Both husband and wife, 
who have officially separated since their arrest, also spent time in 
Bulgaria. 
Three Bulgarian diplomats identified by Scricciolo as enemy agents 
were transferred out of Italy by their own government before ex-
pulsion could take place. Each of them held secretarial rank at the 
Bulgarian Embassy in Rome. They are Simeon Georgiev Diytchnov, 
posted in 1972 and transferred in March of 1978, Ivan Tomov 
Dontchev, posted in December of 1978 and transferred in October 
of 1982, and Venelin Koumbiev, posted in December of 1978 and 
transferred in August of 1983.5 
One final aspect of the Scricciolo/Elia case is addressed in the 
report made on December 20, 1982 by then Defense Minister Lelio 
Lagorio to the Parliament. According to the Minister, SISMI — the 
current Italian military intelligence service — monitors "all radio sig-
nals transmitted by the Bulgarian security services" in Italy. A major 
anomaly was noted "during the days of the abduction, captivity, and 
liberation of General Dozier." He went on to say that ". . . on the day 
of Dozier's liberation, there was a most singular transmission, totally 
exceptional, repeated several times. Counter-espionage believes that 
such type of transmission evidences a direct contact between the [Bul-
garian] intelligence headquarters and an individual and specific agent 
in Italy."6 
The second event of considerable interest is the plot to assassinate 
Walesa. According to the testimony of Mehmet Ali Agca — whose 
attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II will be discussed below — 
plans were underway, several months before the attack on the Pontiff 
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to eliminate Lech Walesa. The exploitable occasion designed for this 
act was intended to be Walesa's visit to Rome, hosted by Italy's major 
labor unions, from January 14 to 19, 1981. Significantly, in the same 
time frame, Agca himself was a hotel guest of the "Isa" residence in 
Rome under the assumed name of Faruk Ozgun as evidenced by a 
counerfeit passport which has since been confiscated by the Italian 
police authorities. 
Operational planning commenced in December of 1981. At least 
one planning session relative to the plot was held in the home of 
Bulgarian diplomat Ivan Tomov Dontchev, whose name also appears 
in the Scricciolo/Elia case. Agca singled out Dontchev by means of 
photographic identification. The initial decision to use a direct armed 
attack (with handgun or rifle) was discarded in favor of explosive 
devices. Three sites in particular were considered: "The Pilgrim's 
Home," the Victoria Hotel, and the foreign press hall, all within Wal-
esa's Roman itinerary which had been disclosed to the Bulgarians by 
a labor union official unknown to Agca. It has been determined that 
the person responsible for Walesa's itinerary was not Scricciolo, as 
initially suspected, but Salvatore Scordo, another UIL official, who is 
currently under investigation because of a substantial bank account 
not commensurate with his relatively modest earnings. 
The third relevant case was the assassination attempt on Pope 
John Paul II. On May 13, 1981, while welcoming a multitude of 
pilgrims in St. Peter's Square,7 the Pope was fired upon twice at close 
range by Turkish national Mehmet Ali Agca, whose background in-
cludes militancy in a neo-Fascist organization known as the Grey Wolves 
and spasmatic travel in Eastern and Western Europe after his escape 
(it has been suggested that his escape was deliberately engineered) 
from a Turkish prison in November of 1979. The would-be assassin 
was immediately apprehended at the scene and sentenced to life im-
prisonment on July 27, 1981.8 Because of his totally uncooperative 
attitude throughout the trial, no material evidence regarding possible 
accomplices emerged at that time. Moreover, Agca did not even appeal 
the court's decision, but announced that he would initiate a hunger 
strike were he not released within five months — a statement generally 
interpreted from the very start as a warning to his behind-the-scenes 
principals. Police investigations continued. 
As he had advised he would, Agca went on a hunger strike in 
December of 1981, but it was of brief duration. He also embarked 
upon the writing of a "memorial" and, in May of the following year 
(1982), his attitude toward the investigators became one of coopera-
tion, so much so that his narration of facts, description of places, and 
photographic identification of principals and accomplices led to the 
indictment of seven foreign nationals, four Turks and three Bulgar-
ians. 
The role played by Agca's fellow Turks appears to be one of 
instigation and logistical support. During a sojourn of fifty days in 
Bulgaria, spanning from mid-July to the end of August of 1980, Agca 
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was offered a large sum of money by Turkish black marketeer Bekir 
Celenk to murder the Pope. Celenk further introduced him to three 
Bulgarians with whose assistance and guidance he was to carry out 
the agreed-upon mission. Another Turk, Omer Bagci, subsequently 
arrested in Switzerland and extradited to Italy, illegally introduced 
into Italian territory the 9mm. Browning automatic pistol used by 
Agca in St. Peter's Square, while Musa Cerdar Celebi, who has since 
been apprehended in Germany and extradited to Italy, furnished 
Agca with the necessary funds for his travels." 
The Bulgarians, on the other hand, appear to have been the 
planners and organizers of the assassination attempt. All three, who 
had been introduced to Agca in Sofia under assumed names, were 
actually posted in Rome. They are Sergei Ivanov Antonov, head of 
the Balkan Air airport office, Todor Stoyanov Ayvazov, treasurer of 
the Bulgarian Embassy, and Jelio Kolev Vassilev, secretary to the 
Bulgarian military attache. Although unfamiliar with their true names, 
Agca was able to furnish their telephone numbers, including an un-
listed one, and to describe in detail Ayvazov's apartment and Anto-
nov's car, in addition to accomplishing positive photographic identi-
fication. According to Agca, planning took place in Ayvazov's 
apartment, while on-the-ground reconnaissance was conducted on 
May 11 and 12, 1981, together with Antonov and Ayvazov, both of 
whom also accompanied the Turkish gunman to St. Peter's Square 
on the day of the attempt. Antonov, whose position as a Balkan Air 
employee does not include diplomatic immunity, was arrested on No-
vember 25, 1982. The other two Bulgarian nationals were transferred 
by their own government before expulsion could take place — a re-
current pattern. 
Besides Agca's testimony — coupled with his identification of 
persons, objects, and places — circumstantial evidence tends to cor-
roborate Bulgarian involvement. First, in his report of December 22, 
1982, to the Parliament, the Defense Minister stated that the Bulgarian 
radio signal anomalies monitored by Italian intelligence during the 
Dozier captivity were also recorded within the time frame of the at-
tempt on the Pope.10 Second, on September 8,1982, well before Agca's 
revelations led to Antonov's arrest, Bulgaria embarked upon a 
preemptive program to discredit the Turk's confessions. On that date, 
the Bulgarian news agency BTA reported that ". . . we would not be 
surprised if some day, upon suggestion or reward, Agca were to state 
that he was tasked by the Bulgarians to kill the Pope."11 
Third, even prior to BTA's commentary, as the "Bulgarian con-
nection" was beginning to surface in the Italian media, on August 27, 
1982, the Bulgarian police arrested two Italian tourists on charges of 
espionage: Paolo Farsetti, an employee of an Arezzo (Tuscany) firm 
and local labor union representative, and his girl friend Gabriella 
Trevisin. They were sentenced to prison terms of ten years and three 
years respectively, by a Sofia court on April 14, 1982. Its decision was 
upheld by an appellate court four months later on August 4th. Ac-
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cording to the "reasoning" of both courts, the couple's overt taking 
of photographs of the exterior of military barracks constitutes a crime 
against Bulgarian national security. In substance, the jailing of Farsetti 
and Trevisin gave and continues to give the Bulgarian government 
bargaining power. Finally, a more recent development, whose con-
nection to the Papal assassination plot is under investigation, involves 
the disappearance of a 15-year old Vatican citizen and resident, Eman-
uela Orlandi, daughter of a Papal messenger.'2 
Orlandi was last seen on June 22, 1983 at approximately 7 p.m. 
in front of a bus stop near her music school in Rome. Six days later, 
Orlandi's relatives and friends had hundreds of wall posters printed 
displaying her picture and listing a Vatican telephone number so that 
anyone having pertinent information could contact the girl's family. 
The following Sunday, the Pope himself made an appeal from his 
balcony on St. Peter's Square during the customary greeting of Ro-
mans and pilgrims. 
On July 5th, suspiciously late with respect to standard kidnapping 
procedures, a caller claimed that the girl had been abducted and 
would be released only in exchange for Mehmet Ali Agca. Since then, 
contradictory and deliberately unclear telephone calls, "commu-
niques," and deadlines have been received by the family, the family's 
lawyer, the Vatican, and the Italian media. The self-styled abductors, 
who appear or wish to appear of diverse nationalities, have displayed 
in some respects an intimate knowledge of the girl, but have failed 
to prove that she is still alive. For his part, Agca has disassociated 
himself from any unlawful efforts to obtain his freedom. 
The investigators are working on various hypotheses, including 
the possibility that the demand for Agca's release may not be issuing 
from kidnappers but from elements interested in exploiting her dis-
appearance after having learned that Orlandi is a Vatican citizen — 
in other words, a follow-up on hostile clandestine endeavors.I:î 
The fourth and final aspect of the Bulgarian/Italian connection 
involves the illicit marketing of weapons. In the course of a judical 
investigation initiated in Trent, a municipalitv in northern Italv, a 
number of Italian and foreign nationals have been arrested. Relative 
to this, the Defense Minister has stated that ". . . counter-espionage 
has ascertained that . . . an important structure is provided bv Kintex, 
a Bulgarian state-owned import-export companv, whose presence has 
been noted in all significant traffic in this field. "" The Minister spe-
cifically referred to a lot of Baretta "7.65" pistols manufactured in 
Italy and sold to Bulgaria, subject to a no-transfer-to-third-parties 
international trade clause. These weapons were subsequently' found 
in the hands of Turkish terrorists. One of the purposes behind this 
illegitimate trade is the acquisition of valuable foreign currency needed 
by Bulgaria for various types of operations. It also explains her con-
tacts with individuals such as Turkish nationals Bekir Celenk and 
Mehmet Ali Agca. 
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As best as it can be established from the public record, the conduct 
of major clandestine operations by the Bulgarian intelligence services 
in Italy is a departure for the Bulgarians. Yet, it would be unforgivably 
naive to consider the "Bulgarian connection" as the offspring of in-
dependent Bulgarian decision-making. Various indicators point in a 
different direction. 
Bulgarian as well as Soviet defectors have testified that foreign 
operations are assigned to the Bulgarian intelligence establishment 
by its Soviet "mentors."13 Moreover, the hostile acts falling under the 
heading of the "Bulgarian connection" bear no correlation whatsoever 
to particular Bulgarian national interests, be they strategic, political, 
or economic. More significantly, the "Bulgarian connection" is in many 
ways reminiscent of the structures and patterns adopted by the USSR 
and the Soviet-dominated East European Communist bloc for clan-
destine operations on the Italian peninsula since the end of World 
War II. The following cases offer comparative terms of reference. 
First, the Communist bloc countries have consistently posted dispro-
portionately large diplomatic missions in relation to their legitimate 
needs in Italy. The diplomatic personnel lists indicate the current figures: 
USSR — 44, Czechoslovakia — 19, Bulgaria — 15, Poland — 17, 
German Democratic Republic — 16, Hungary — 16, and Romania 
— 15. These numbers do not include adjunct technical personnel en-
joying more limited diplomatic imunity."' Since 1945, at least 61 Com-
munist bloc diplomats have been expelled or barred from re-entering 
Italy.17 Further, for clandestine purposes, the Communist bloc has 
availed itself of non-diplomatic personnel operating under a com-
mercial cover. Most recently, on February 15, 1983, the Carabinieri 
arrested Viktor Pronin, deputy manager of the Rome commercial 
office of Aeroflot, the Soviet airlines, on charges of military and tech-
nological espionage. 
Communist bloc objectives in Italy traditionally include the Vat-
ican as well as Catholic institutions in general. As far back as 1952, it 
was discovered that Father Aligheri Tondi, a professor at the Gre-
gorian Academy in Rome, was in fact a Soviet agent. More recently, 
in 1975, it was determined that former priests Jeroslav Vojetch and 
Frantisek Krusik had been 'infiltrated' into the Collegio Nepomuceno, 
the Vatican's Czech institute in Rome. According to a Czech defector, 
Radio Vatican has been the object of special Communist bloc sur-
veillance."* 
Italian labor unions likewise attract continued Soviet interest. 
Documentation issuing from the Central Council of Soviet Labor 
Unions reflects plans for the periodic exchange of delegations with 
the Italian unions at all levels to discuss such topics as "scientific and 
technological progress." Connected to this program is the "mating," 
through joint labor union efforts, of Italian and Soviet cities, for 
example, Genoa-Odessa, Milan-Leningrad, Venice-Tallin, Livorno-
Novosibirsk, and Palermo-Tiflis. All of these Italian cities are major 
industrial centers, important sea-ports, or both.1-' 
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Italy's territory has frequently been used as a base for espionage 
operations that extend beyond her boundaries. The most notorious 
case concerned Soviet recruitment of civilian parachutist Giorgio Rin-
aldi Ghislieri, who became, until his arrest in 1967, a leading operative 
in a spy network stretching from Europe to Africa.-"' Moreover, Italy 
served as an intermediary station to finance subversion in Spain and 
South America in the mid-1960s. Funds earmarked for this purpose 
originated in Prague and passed through Trieste and Milan.21 
Several Italian organizations have been the recipients of "subsi-
dies" from Communist bloc countries. The Italian Communist Party 
still acquires part of its revenue from commissions on trade with the 
Warsaw Pact countries.22 The Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian 
Unity (PSIUP) was heavily financed by Moscow since its birth in 1964, 
to the point of losing all political independence.M In 1978, the Milan 
branch of the Autonomy, a grouping of the extreme left with terrorist 
tendencies, received financial assistance from the Czech motor com-
pany Skoda.24 
Recruitment for clandestine operations does not necessarily de-
pend upon ideological affinity. "Interlocutors" of Communist bloc 
agents in Italy frequently include mercenary-minded individuals, as 
in most industrial espionage cases,2"' as well as individuals with a right-
ist background, such as the above-mentioned Giorgio Rinaldi Ghislieri 
and his wife Angela Maria Antoniola. 
Innocent Italian nationals have more than once been subjected 
to arrest for bargaining purposes. In 1967, Hungarian commercial 
representative Ferenc Budaj, who was convicted of espionage bv the 
Court of Assizes of Milan, had to be released in exchange for Professor 
Giovanni Gambelli, head of the Italian Cultural Institute in Budapest, 
who was arrested on trumped-up charges by the Hungarian police. 
As recently as July of 1983, the above-mentioned Soviet spy Viktor 
Pronin was released on bail reportedly to put an end to the specious 
detention — short of arrest — in the Soviet Union of Luigi Vismara, 
the Moscow correspondent of Milan's II Giorno, and of two other 
Italian citizens.-'" 
Finally, Communist bloc clandestine operations have a long his-
tory of linkage with terrorist activity on the Italian peninsula. In the 
late 1940s, both Yugoslavia — before her break from the Soviet fold 
— and Czechoslovakia were providing safehaven and paramilitary 
training to hundreds of Italian Communists and former partisans. At 
the beginning of the 1960s, Czech intelligence surreptitiously aided 
violent Germanic separatist aspirations in the Trentino-Alto Adige 
region of northern Italy. In the early 1970s, three fugitive Italian 
terrorists of the left found refuge and employment in Czechoslovakia. 
At least four additional leading elements of Italy's Communist-in-
spired terrorist fringe spent time in that countrv, as intelligence re-
ports were disclosing the presence of special training sites in Doupov, 
Karlovy Vary, Smokovec, Bratislava, Lidice, and Leda. Later in the 
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decade, Czech keys were confiscated in a captured Red Brigades safe 
house in the Rome area.27 
A number of factors account for Communist bloc targeting of 
Italy through the years. Her strategic position in the Mediterranean, 
her politico-military posture in NATO's southern flank, her signifi-
cance as the seventh most industralized nation, and the site of the 
Papacy make Italy a lucrative target. At the same time, endemic po-
litical crises, governmental instability, socio-economic upheavals, and 
the presence of the largest non-ruling Communist Party in the world 
make Italy a vulnerable target. 
Within this context, the emergence of the "Bulgarian connection" 
is all the more sinister as it coincides, by various indicators, with no-
teworthy developments in the areas of Italian internal affairs and 
Italian foreign policy. In retrospect, major Bulgarian penetration ef-
forts can be detected just as the Italian law enforcement agencies 
started to neutralize the terrorist formations that had ravaged Italy's 
socio-political landscape for a decade and as the Italian Government 
was assuming unprecedented foreign policy and military commit-
ments. 
In late 1979, Italy actively supported the NATO decision to de-
ploy the modernized theatre nuclear force (TNF) — the "Euromis-
siles" — which, among other things, authorized the installation of 112 
cruise missiles in the town of Comiso in Sicily. On September 15, 
1980, Italy signed a treaty with Malta guaranteeing the protection of 
her neutrality.28 In March of 1982, Italy contributed a small detach-
ment and three minesweepers to the multinational peace-keeping force 
in the Sinai. The following September, she sent a contingent of 2200 
men to Lebanon to participate in the multinational peace-keeping 
forces there. In October, the Defense Minister announced that Italy's 
defenses in the south would be upgraded, a departure from a policy 
that in substance assessed the potential military threat as limited to 
Italy's northeastern frontiers.29 
These developments are being challenged, through "passive re-
sistance," "civil disobedience," and other illegal means, by an articulate 
peace movement that is particularly active in Comiso, where the prep-
aratory work is already underway to host the cruise missiles. Signifi-
cantly, the Comiso "rallying point" is attracting protesters of various 
nationalities and drawing foreign financing. Both the official Italian 
Communist Party and other groups more openly taking Soviet-in-
spired positions are lending various types of support to the pacifist 
effort.30 
In the light of the Communist bloc's well-documented record of 
clandestine involvement in Italy, the nature and timing of the "Bul-
garian connection" cannot but lead to the conclusion that Bulgaria's 
role is merely that of a "surrogate" of the Soviet Union in the accom-
plishment of anti-Western designs. Given the low profile traditionally 
maintained by Sofia's agents in Italy — in keeping with the above-
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discussed, slow-paced relationship between the two countries — the 
Soviet tasking of that Balkan state with what has turned out to be the 
"Bulgarian connection" wholly meets the standards of the clandestine 
craft. 
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